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THE ETHICAL PRACTICE OF HUMAN-CENTERED
CIVIL JUSTICE DESIGN
VICTOR D. QUINTANILLA* & HALEY HINKLE
ABSTRACT
Over the past two decades, legal professionals have increasingly engaged in
a new form of professional activity: civil justice design. In the past, legal
professionals handled cases and transactions for clients or served as neu-
trals, including mediators and arbitrators, who helped to resolve disputes
between parties. Today, legal professionals increasingly play a principal
design role in creating systems that resolve streams of conflicts, disputes,
and grievances between parties. Lawyers regularly now create internal
grievance procedures, procedures for companies to resolve disputes with cus-
tomers, and court-annexed alternative dispute resolution systems. The
emergence of this new role raises difficult questions about the ethics and
responsibilities that attach to legal professionals who serve as civil justice
designers. The prmary ethical dilemma for these civil justice designers will
be the tension between, on the one hand, maximizing a client's interest
and, on the other, providing the public with vibrant, fair, just, and legiti-
mate institutions for resolving disputes. The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct offer little guidance on how to resolve these tensions, and sociali-
zation into the legal profession may lead legal professionals to distance
themselves from ethical responsibilities. These trends and conditions may
result in systemic civil justice problems and a tragedy of the commons,
which saps the longevity of our legal institutions. Yet there is a wider more
virtuous moral principle that applies to all human relations: the principle
of neighborly morality. In this article, I discuss the principle of neighborly
morality and an analytical framework developed by Professors Howard
Gardner, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, and William Damon for understand-
ing role ethics. I discuss the ethical responsibilities that apply to civil jus-
tice designers, including the criteria of excellence, engagement, and ethics,
and a reflective practice of dispute system design, human-centered civil jus-
tice design, which assists civil justice designers in resolving this tension.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, legal professionals have increasingly
engaged in a new form of professional activity: civil justice design.' In
the past, legal professionals handled cases and transactions for clients
* Director, Center for Law, Society & Culture, Indiana University, Bloomington;
Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; Adjunct Professor
Indiana University Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences.
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1. See Victor D. Quintanilla, Human-Centered Civiljustice Design, 121 PENN Sr. L. REv.
745 (2017); infra Part I.
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or served as neutrals, including mediators and arbitrators, who helped
to resolve disputes between parties. Today, legal professionals increas-
ingly play a principal design role in creating systems that resolve
streams of conflicts, disputes, and grievances between parties. Often,
these legal professionals seek to create dispute systems that are cost effi-
cient and effective. For example, lawyers regularly now create internal
grievance procedures, procedures for companies to resolve disputes
with customers, and court-annexed alternative dispute resolution
systems.2
In short, legal professionals now increasingly serve in a relatively
new social and professional role: the role of civil justice designer. This
trend is desirable. When legal professionals occupy new roles in soci-
ety, they bring important skills and habits of mind, often including
commitments to preserve the legitimacy of legal institutions and serve
the public.3
Yet the emergence of this new role raises difficult questions about
the ethics and responsibilities that attach to legal professionals who
serve as civil justice designers. The primary ethical dilemma for these
civil justice designers will be the tension between, on the one hand,
maximizing a client's interest and, on the other, providing the public
with vibrant, fair, just, and legitimate institutions for resolving dis-
putes.4 The professional ethics that apply to civil justice designers must
assist in resolving this tension. In this article, I discuss the ethical
responsibilities that apply to civil justice designers and a reflective prac-
tice of dispute system design, human-centered civil justice design, which
assists legal professionals in resolving this tension.
The first challenge is that while lawyers increasingly serve in the
new role of civil justice designer, the professional responsibilities that
attach to this role are ill-defined.5 For example, the American Bar Asso-
ciation ("ABA") Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"
or "Rules") elaborate the responsibilities that emanate from the duty to
serve clients, but offer little guidance on how to reconcile the tension
between serving a client's interest and avoiding harm to the public
when designing civil justice systems. Even so, when legal professionals
engage in civil justice design, their labor impacts not only their clients,
but also the diverse array of stakeholders affected by any dispute system
through which streams of conflict flow. While the Preamble of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct calls on legal professionals to
serve as officers of the court and to care about the quality of justice,
these aspirational calls are not binding and are in marked tension with
other aspects of the Model Rules, which describe a legal professional's
2. See discussion and notes infra Part I.
3. See discussion and notes infra Part I.
4. See discussion and notes infa Part II and Part IV; see, e.g., Victor D. Quintanilla &
Alexander B. Avtgis, The Public Believes Predispute Binding Arbitration Clauses Are Unjust: Ethi-
cal Implications for Dispute-System Design in the Time of Vanishing Thals, 85 FORDHAM L. REv.
2119 (2017).
5. See discussion and notes infra Part II.
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primary duty as emanating from the lawyer-client relationship.6 Fur-
ther, empirical research suggests that legal education and professional
socialization threaten these public-spirited aspirations from taking
root.7 Taken together, this dearth of guidance in the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and the deleterious effects of professional sociali-
zation may leave lawyers with the belief that they must zealously
advance their client's interest when designing a system for resolving
disputes.
Were a legal professional to disregard the harm they cause to stake-
holders and the public when designing a civil justice system, that indif-
ference would be inconsistent with a wider, more virtuous moral
principle that applies to all human relations.8 "Do unto others as you
wish them to do to you" is a moral precept of human relations that is
virtually universally endorsed.9 Indeed, the basic intuitions guiding the
"Golden Rule" can be found reflected in world religions and western
and eastern philosophical systems.LO This moral compass of neighborly
morality speaks to the importance of avoiding harm to others, and
treating others well, and has roots in faith, philosophy, and science.11
The second challenge is extending this basic precept of neighborly
morality into a role ethic for civil justice designers.' 2 For example,
while the principle itself warns against harming others within one's
community, the principle alone is insufficient for specifying the role
ethic and responsibilities that attach to newly emerging roles in society.
In this article, I will apply the analytical framework created by Profes-
sors Howard Gardner, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, and William Damon for
analyzing role ethics. 3 Under this framework, new professional roles
require three virtues: excellence, engagement, and ethics. 14 For exam-
ple, when a legal professional engages in civil justice design, the lawyer
has a responsibility to develop expertise and knowledge of the special-
ized knowledge in the field on how to design systems that resolve
streams of conflict. Developing this expertise would meet the criteria of
excellence. Next, when a legal professional engages in civil justice
design, the lawyer has a responsibility to truly understand and learn the
nature of causes and conditions that may improve or harm the aspira-
tions, needs, and common concerns for those whom she designs.
Developing this understanding from stakeholders about the context in
which she designs would meet the criteria of engagement. Finally, a
civil justice designer would have the responsibility to act ethically, to
avoid harm, and to have compassion for those whom she seeks to serve.
6. See discussion and notes infra Part II.
7. See discussion and notes infra Part II.
8. See discussion and notes infra Part III.
9. See discussion and notes infra Part III.
10. See discussion and notes infra Part III.
11. See discussion and notes infra Part III.
12. See discussion and notes infra Part IV.
13. See generally HOWARD GARDNER, TRUTH, BEAuTW, AND GooDNEss REFRAMED
(2011).
14. See discussion and notes infra Part IV.
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The final challenge is identifying a practice or process whereby
civil justice designers can accomplish the three criteria of excellence,
engagement, and ethics.' 5 In this article, I illuminate one such ethical
practice, human-centered civil justice design, which can be adopted by law-
trained individuals who seek to serve others in the role as civil justice
designers or architects.16
I. GRow-i OF DISPUTE-SYSTEM DESIGN AND THE ROLE
OF CIVIL JUSTICE DESIGNERS
In the past fifty years, we have witnessed a rise in the number of
legal professionals who serve in a relatively new role: the role of civil
justice designer.17 The emergence of this new role for legal profession-
als parallels the shift in emphasis from practicing traditional forms of
adversarial litigation toward creating dispute systems that solve conflict
between repeat players and designing internal grievance structures
within private organizations' 8 and court-annexed alternative dispute
resolution (ADR).1* As the need for creating effective dispute systems
has increased, legal professionals have been called to shift their empha-
sis from harnessing ex-post procedures to litigate disputes to designing
ex-ante structures that resolve streams of disputes in an effective
manner.20
15. See discussion and notes infra Part V.
16. See Quintanilla, supra note 1; discussion and notes infra Part V.
17. The role of civil justice designer differs from the role of mediator or arbitrator.
By way of example, whereas mediators and arbitrators largely administer a process of
alternative dispute resolution, a civil justice designer would explicitly reflect on and create
the court-annexed ADR system in which these mediators or arbitrators are called on to
serve. Leaders in organizations such as the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"),
the Center for Public Resources Institute for Dispute Resolution ("CPR"), and the Associ-
ation of Conflict Resolution, insofar as they develop structures, protocols, and practices
that comprise the dispute system in which conflicts are resolved serve in the role of civil
justice designers. From another angle, the distinction shifts from the perspective of a
neutral who seeks to resolve a dispute on behalf of particular parties, to the perspective of
an architect who reflects on the features of a wider system or structure through which a
stream of present or future disputes and conflicts will flow.
18. See, e.g., Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Cynthia J. Hallberlin, Denise A. Walker &
Won-Tae Chung, Dispute System Design and justice in Employment Dispute Resolution: Mediation
at the Workplace, 14 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 1 (2009) (dispute system design and internal
grievance systems); Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the "Haves" Hold Court:
Speculations on the Organizational Internationalization of Law, 33 L. & Soc'y REV. 941 (1999)
(on the rise of private dispute resolution within organizations); DAVID B. LIPSKY ET AL.,
EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING WORKPLACE CONFLICT: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN CORiPO-
RATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND DISPuTE RESOLUTION PROFESSIONALS 6 (2003).
19. See Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion Movement is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165 (2003); Frank E.A.
Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Addresses Delivered at the National Conference
on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of justice (Apr. 7-9,
1976) in 70 F.R.D. 79, 111 (1976).
20. See WILLIAM L. URY, JEANNE M. BRE-rr & STEPI-IEN B. GOLDBERG, GETTING Dis-
Pms RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT TIE COSTS OF CONFLIcr 41-42 (1988) ("[A]
dispute resolution system is designed to reduce the costs of handling disputes and to
produce more satisfying and durable resolutions."); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as
Consensus Builder: Ethics for a New Practice, 70 TENN. L. REv. 63, 80 (2002) [hereinafter
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The field of dispute system design began in the context of labor
management and internal grievance structures.2 ' For example, in the
late 1980s, legal professionals began creating structures to resolve griev-
ances between employees and employers. 2 2 Later, legal professionals
became involved in developing ADR procedures,23 fashioning, for
example, court-annexed mediation and non-binding arbitration alter-
natives to jury trials.2 4 Over the past decade, legal professionals also
began creating binding consumer arbitration regimes, which have pro-
liferated in recent years. 25
Legal professionals now routinely serve private and public organi-
zations by creating systems to resolve streams of conflict that emanate
from harm to employees and customers along with the grievances that
flow from these adverse events.2 6 Legal professionals are involved in
creating dispute systems that serve stakeholders inside private and pub-
lic organizations;2 7 affected stakeholders outside organizations, such as
customers and members of the public harmed by business activity;28
and between users of online platforms. 29 Judges and lawyers, moreo-
ver, are increasingly involved in creating (or improving upon) problem-
Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder]; Shauhin A. Talesh, How Dispute Resolu-
tion System Design Matters: An Organizational Analysis of Dispute Resolution Structures and Con-
sumer Lemon Laws, 46 L. & Soc'y. REV. 463, 466 (2012) [hereinafter Talesh, How Dispute
Resolution System Design Matters].
21. See URY ET. AL., supra note 20, at 41-64; Lisa Blomgren Bingham, DesigningJus-
tice: Legal Institutions and Other Systems for Managing Conflict, 24 OHIO ST.J. ON Disp. RESOL.
1, 10 (2008).
22. See, e.g., URY ET. AL., supra note 20, at 41-64; see LIwsKY ET AL., supra note 18, at
6-8.
23. See Hensler, supra note 19, at 174-181; Paul D. Carrington, ADR and Future Adju-
dication: A Primer on Dispute Resolution, 15 REv. LITIG. 485 (1996).
24. See, e.g., DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACrICE (Jay Folberg & Ann Milne
eds., 1988); E. ALLAN LIND & JOHN E. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRA-
TION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1983); ELIZABETH RoLP-, INTRODUCING COURT-
ANNEXED ARBITRATION: A POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE (1984).
25. Quintanilla & Avtgis, supra note 4; see alsoJ. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims
and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L. J. 3052, 3074-75 (2015); Patrick E. Higgin-
botham, The Present Plight of the United States District Courts, 60 DUKE L. J. 745, 752 (2010);
Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts,
and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L. J. 2804, 2808-11 (2015).
26. See, e.g., NANCY H. ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES FOR MAN-
AGING DISPUTES (2013); LISA BLOMGREN AmsLER, JANET MARTINEZ & STEPHANIE SMrrH, Dis-
PUTE SYSTEM DESIGN (2017).
27. See, e.g., Blomgren Bingham et al., supra note 18, at 2-4; see generally CATHY A.
COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS:
A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS (1996).
28. Talesh, How Dispute Resolution System Design Matters, supra note 20, at 464-66
(tracing the development of ADR systems that allowed automobile manufacturers to
resolve disputes with dissatisfied customers); Robert H. Jerry, II, Dispute Resolution, Insur-
ance, and Points of Convergence, 2015 J. Disp. RESOL. 255, 262-64 (2015) (tracing ADR
response to natural disasters to Hurricane Andrew in 1992); Tracy A. Thomas, Symposium:
Remedies For Big Disasters: The BP Gulf Oil Spill and the Quest For Complete justice, 45 AKRON L.
REV. 567 (2012).
29. Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan Katsh, Technology and the Future of Dispute Systems
Design, 17 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 151, 164-75 (2012) (describing the emergence of Online
Dispute Resolution (ODR) in the early stages of the internet, and outlining a need for
more DSD principles in ODR, and vice versa).
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solving courts, 30 deciding how space within courthouses can be best
used, and deciding how to allocate scarce resources across the state to
legal aid providers to improve the statewide delivery of access to jus-
tice.3 ' Finally, legal professionals have been called to design systems to
resolve disputes emerging from mass-scale events that affect wide swaths
of society, such as the dispute systems designed after September 11 and
the BP oil spill.3 2 Often situations like these present challenges for
those who create dispute processing systems and call for creativity and
innovation to meet the needs, concerns, and aspirations of stakeholders
effectively.
Like other authors, I use the word design to mean the intentional
and reflective creation of a system or process to achieve a set of goals.
Whereas others have written about dispute system design in the context
of intra-organizational conflicts (employer-employee disputes) and con-
flicts between repeat-player parties with continuing relationships and
transactions (business-supplier), by civil justice design I mean to connote
a broader family of reflective activity, including designing systems and
processes that seek to serve the public or that affect the quality of public
legal institutions. Legal professionals, both judges and lawyers, are
increasingly called to serve in the role of civil justice designers when
creating processes, systems, and institutions for stakeholders and the
public.3 3 When engaged in the role of civil justice designer, legal pro-
fessionals work closely with stakeholders and communities with affected
interests to diagnose problems and needs, they design and implement
systems that seek to address these problems and needs, and evaluate the
performance of the systems designed.3 4
In the 1970s, Professor Frank Sander envisioned the trend toward
court-annexed alternative dispute resolution structures and coined the
term the "multi-door courthouse."3 5 Today, when viewed across the arc
of a professional career and when examining the many roles performed
by a legal professional at a particular time, lawyers serve as "multi-role"
legal professionals. At multiple points in a legal professional's career,
she may serve in the role of a litigator, transactional attorney, and civil
30. Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder, supra note 20, at 81; Shauhin
Talesh, Mental Health Court Judges as Dynamic Risk Managers: A New Conceptualization of the
Role of Judges, 57 DEPAUL L. REv. 93, 113-27 (2007) (outlining the role ofjudges in prob-
lem-solving mental health courts).
31. See Laura Abel, Designing Access: Using Institutional Design to Improve Decision Mak-
ing About the Distribution of Free Civil Legal Aid, 7 HARV. L. & Po'Y REV. 61, 81-82 (2013).
32. Lawyers use their consensus-building skills in public policy contexts to facilitate
complex debates around legislative rule-drafting and regulatory negotiations (called
negotiated rulemaking or "reg-neg"). Acting as neutral facilitators, lawyers can help
stakeholders reach solutions to complex problems such as environmental clean-up plans.
See Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder, supra note 20, at 75-76; see also Maria
R. Volpe, Post Disaster ADR Responses: Promises and Challenges, 26 FORDI-tAM ENvri... L. REv.
95, 96-99 (2014).
33. See Quintanilla, supra note 1; Edelman & Suchman, supra note 18; Talesh, How
Dispute Resolution System Design Matters, supra note 20.
34. See generally Quintanilla, supra note 1; ROGERS ET. AL., supra note 26; AmsLER,
MARTINEZ & Smrrii, supra note 26.
35. Sander, supra note 19, at 111.
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justice designer. So too, in a judge's career, a judge may serve in the
role of a neutral arbiter within the courtroom and in the role of an
architect, designer, or administrator of within-court or out-of-court
processes, systems, or institutions on the public's behalf.
That legal professionals are increasingly inhabiting these roles is
desirable. Legal professionals, for example, often bring a public spirit-
edness to their work on behalf of communities and habits of mind that
include close study of processes and how people interact with these
processes. Indeed, lawyers serve a unique, indispensable role that
serves the public's interest, which involves the intermediation of class,
policy, and partisan interests, or private interests, public values, and
institutions. Alexis de Tocqueville elaborated this wider ethic,3 6 Talcott
Parsons expounded on it,37 and Louis Brandeis also advanced this
more public spiritedness.3 8 As Anthony Kronman has stated,
Lawyers serve the private interests of their clients but they also
care about the integrity and justice of the legal system that defines
the public order within which these interests are pursued. In this
way they provide a link between the realms of public and of pri-
vate life, helping to rejoin what the forces of privatization are con-
stantly pulling apart.3 9
Lawyers aspire to safeguard the legitimacy of the civil justice system
and our public institutions, and, as public-spirited professionals, work
for democracy to flourish. Yet, as this role has increasingly emerged,
one pressing challenge has been defining the ethics or the best prac-
tices in this new and emerging area of civil justice design. The ethics
and responsibilities that apply to legal professionals in these new roles
are not specified in traditional formulations of model rules.40 This lack
36. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMoCRACY IN AMERICA 243 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner
eds., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row, Publishers 1966) (1835) ("[Lawyers] serve
as arbiters between the citizens . . . .").
37. See TALcorr PARSONS, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN Socio-
LOGICAL THEORY 370, 370-71 (The Free Press rev. ed. 1954) (elaborating the role of law-
yers as serving both clients and the public interest, a role that maintains stability and
dynamism in democratic society); TALCOTT PARSONS, The Professions and Social Structure, in
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34, 38 (The Free Press rev. ed. 1954).
38. See Louis D. Brandeis, Address to the Harvard Ethical Society: The Opportunity
in the Law (May 4, 1905), in BUSINESS-A PROFESSION 329 (Small, Maynard & Co. 1925)
(discussing the role of lawyers in protecting public interest); see also Robert F. Cochran,
Jr., Louis D. Brandeis and the Lawyer Advocacy System, 40 PEPP. L. REv. 351, 354-56 (2013).
39. Anthony T. Kronman, Professionalism, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETI-Iics 89, 95
(1999).
40. See Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder, supra note 20, at 113. ("Our
legal ethical standards (as lawyers) do not provide useful beacons of light as we navigate
in these new, but much needed, roles."); Bingham, supra note 21, 47-48 (2008) ("How-
ever, individual practitioners find themselves designing justice, and we do not have ethi-
cal guidance for them in this emerging role."); Louise Otis & Eric H. Reiter, Mediation by
judges: A New Phenomenon in the Transformation offustice, 6 PEPPl. Dise. RESOL. L.J. 351, 369
(2006) (Otis and Reiter discuss the possibilities of institutionalizing alternative dispute
resolution within courts, as well as the precautions that would be necessary if judges took
on roles in these processes. "It is important as well to acknowledge that mediation
requires judges to play a different role than their familiar adjudicative function."); Orna
Rabinovich-Einy, The Legitimacy Crisis and the Future of Courts, 17 CARDozo J. CONFLICT
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of specification stems from the wide gap between these newly emerging
roles and traditional legal roles exemplified by the lawyer-client
relationship.4 1
II. CIVIL JUSTICE DESIGNERS, THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, AND CONCERNS ABOUT ZEALOUS ADVOCACY
The rise of this new role raises questions about the ethical responsi-
bilities and contours of a lawyer's role when engaged in civil justice
design. At root, the ethical quandary will be not whether this new form
of practice is good for legal professionals or clients, but instead whether
the role of civil justice designer is good for the public at large.4 2 The
chief difficulty is that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct are pri-
marily geared for the responsibilities that flow to clients within the law-
yer-client relationship, and largely in the context of the adversarial
process.43
In this regard, Professors Vicki Jackson and Carrie Menkel-Meadow
have reasoned that the Model Rules fail to recognize lawyers in what is
publicly recognized as among the most important role a lawyer per-
forms-that of a "constructive lawyer." 44 The Model Code of Judicial
Conduct is similarly limited insofar as it is primarily geared to the role
of judges as neutral decision-makers in disputes within the court-
room.4 5 As such, in this section, we examine the extent to which (if at
RESOL. 23 (2015) (arguing that informal dispute resolution processes that grew out of
ADR in the 1970s and 1980s have created a need for new sources of legitimacy outside of
the formal rule codes).
41. See infra Part II.
42. See David Luban, Asking the Right Questions, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 839, 839 (1999)
("The right question is not whether new roles with no rules are good for lawyers and
clients, but rather whether they are good for the rest of us-'us' being the citizenry who
count on lawyers to be guardians of the law, and who market forces will not necessarily
protect.").
43. See generally Kimberlee K. Kovach, The Intersection (Collision) of Ethics, Law, and
Dispute Resolution: Clashes, Crashes, No Stops, Yields, or Rights of Way, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 789,
808-10 (2008) ("Lawyers are viewed as problem solvers who are able to not only represent
clients in court, but who are also able to view the entirety of the client's problems and
envision a variety of solutions. This is a far different vision than that of lawyers as battle-
warriors in court."); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Are There Systemic Ethics Issues in Dis-
pute System Design? And What We Should [Not] Do About It: Lessons from International and
Domestic Fronts, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 195, 200-04 (2009).
44. See Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder, supra note 20, at 72; Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral: Creativity and Non-
Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 785, 786 (1999) (quoting VickiJackson, Profes-
sor, Remarks at the Meeting of the CPR Comm'n on Problem Solving in Legal Educ., at
Geo. Univ. L. Ctr. (Oct. 22, 1999)).
45. Canon 3 of the Model Code of'Judicial Conduct addresses "extrajudicial activi-
ties." It begins with Rule 3.1, which says: "[W]hen engaging in extrajudicial activities, a
judge shall not: (A) participate in activities that will interfere with the proper perform-
ance of the judge's judicial duties; (B) participate in activities that will lead to frequent
disqualification of the judge; (C) participate in activities that would appear to a reasona-
ble person to undermine the judge's independence, integrity, or impartiality; (D) engage
in conduct that would appear to a reasonable person to be coercive; or (E) make use of
court premises, staff, stationery, equipment, or other resources, except for incidental use
for activities that concern the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice, or
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all) the Model Rules of Professional Conduct delimit the conduct and
craft of lawyers engaged in civil justice design.4 6
A. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct outline broad pro-
fessional duties that lawyers have to their clients and aspirations of how
legal professionals will serve the court, the bar, and the public. While
the Rules recognize that lawyers may serve in multiple roles, including
as counselors, 4 7 prosecutors,4 8 and government lawyers, 49 the Rules
emphasize the lawyer-client relationship and the role of lawyers in the
adversarial process.50 In light of the Rules' emphasis on the lawyer-
client relationship, many lawyers conceive of the lawyer's duty as that of
zealously advocating on behalf of their clients' interests. 51 The Model
Rules do not speak to the role that lawyers play when designing legal
unless such additional use is permitted by law." MODEL CODE OFJUD. CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM.
BAR Ass'N 2007). See also Kimberlee K Kovach, The Intersection (Collision) of Ethics, Law,
and Dispute Resolution: Clashes, Crashes, No Stops, Yields, or Rights of Way, 49 S. TEX. L. REV.
789, 821 (2008) ('judges themselves, who mix the role of mediators and adjudicators,
confront ethical dilemmas . . . . Yet, what guidelines govern [mediation participants']
conduct?").
46. While we reference the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, this code is a
model that many states have adopted. The promulgated state codes would serve as the
positive law in particular jurisdictions. See Lucian T. Pera, Grading ABA Leadership on Legal
Ethics Leadership: State Adoption of the Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30
OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 637 (2005) (tracking state adoption of the ABA's 2002 amendments
to the Model Rules); Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's
Impartiality "Might Reasonably Be Questioned," 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55 (2000) (writ-
ing that forty-nine states have adopted some version of the ABA's Model Code of judicial
Conduct).
47. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.9 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016) (discussing
the procedures a lawyer must follow when "representing a client before a legislative body
or administrative agency in a nonajudicative proceeding").
48. See id. at r. 3.8 (discussing the particular ethical responsibilities of prosecutors
in criminal cases).
49. See id. at r. 1.11 (discussing conflicts of interest specific to current and former
government lawyers).
50. See, e.g., id. at r. 2.1, r. 2.3-2.4 (stating that a lawyer may advise a client on
"moral, economic, social and political" considerations, provide a third party with "an eval-
uation of a matter affecting a client" if "compatible with ... the lawyer's relationship with
the client[,]" and serve as a third-party neutral for "two or more persons who are not" the
lawyer's clients).
51. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder, supra note 20; MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016) ("A lawyer must also act with commitment
and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's
behalf."). The principle of zealous advocacy as expressed within the professional rules
has waxed and waned across time. For example, the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility previously stated, "[tihe duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal
system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law." MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESP. EC 7-1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1980). While the ABA's Ethical Considerations were
not mandatory, they were aspirational and represented the objectives toward which every
member of the profession should strive and constituted a body of principles upon which
lawyers can rely for guidance in many specific situations. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE: AN ETHIcAL STUDY 11 (1988) (discussing how wide and narrow understandings of
this principle have dueled across time); see also Carol Rice Andrews, Ethical Limits on Civil
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processes or institutions that serve the public whether within or without
the attorney-client relationship.
Lawyers who engage in dispute system design within the scope of
an attorney-client relationship invariably face tension between the
norm of zealously advancing their client's interests and a wider ethic
that seeks to limit harm to third parties and guard the quality ofjustice
for all. For example, a legal professional who serves in the role of a
dispute system designer may seek to maximize his or her client's eco-
nomic interest with zeal. In this regard, the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct state, "[a] s advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an
informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and
explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously
asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system." 52
From this perspective, dispute system designers working at the behest of
clients might deduce an ethical principle that says they should advance
their clients' interests with zeal, rather than to weigh whether the pub-
lic's interest in a just, fair, neutral, and legitimate civil justice system is
in conflict with their client's interests.5 3 The ethical principle of zeal-
ously advancing a client's interest may motivate these dispute system
designers to select features of a dispute system that advance their cli-
ent's economic interests as far as they can go within the broad delega-
tion and discretion of decision-making authority allowed.5 4
Litigation Advocacy: A Historical Perspective, 63 CASE W. Res. L. REv. 381, 427-35 (2012);
William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1083, 1084-90 (1988).
52. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016); see also Michael
H. Rubin, The Ethical Utah Lawyer: What Are the Limits in Negotiation?, 21 UTAl B.J. (2d ser.)
15, 15 (2008) ("Variations of the phrase 'zealous advocate' are currently relegated to
mere aspirational statements in the Preamble to both the ABA Model Rules and the Utah
Rules of Professional Conduct . . . . [Y]et, this has not stopped lawyers from using the
phrase or courts from extolling it."); 35 COLO. L. 105, 122 (2006) (showing that the Colo-
rado Supreme Court Standing Committee on the Colorado Rules of Professional Con-
duct solicited comments in 2006 on the use of "zealous" during its review of the ABA's
2002 version of the Model Rules); see also 35 COLO. L. 105, supra at 122 ("A majority of the
Standing Committee, however, believes that the concept of zealous representation within
the bounds of the law remains a valuable guidepost for lawyers and, accordingly, recom-
mends retention of the words 'zeal,' 'zealous' and 'zealously' in the Preamble and in the
Comment to Rule 1.3."); see also Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HoFsrRc L. REV.
1165, 1193 (2006) ("Regarding zeal, the Rules make only one occupational distinction:
the Preamble assigns this duty most clearly to the lawyer who serves as advocate. In
response, commentators have divided on the question of whether, or to what extent, zeal
applies to lawyers outside the context of litigation and similar settings where the client
faces an adversary." (footnote omitted)).
53. See Quintanilla & Avtgis, supra note 4, at 2133; DEBORAll L. RHODE, IN THE INTER-
ESTS OFJUSTICE: REFORMING TIE LEGAL PROFESSION 49-80 (2000); Austin Sarat, The Profes-
sion Versus the Public Interest: Reflections on Two Reifications, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1491, 1493
(2002) (book review).
54. See Robin West, The Zealous Advocacy ofJustice in a Less Than Ideal Legal World, 51
SrAN. L. REV. 973, 974 (1999) ("The ideal of lawyering espoused by the profession, and
memorialized by the various codes of ethics that govern it, strips the lawyer of responsibil-
ity for the moral quality of not only his clients' ends but also of his own actions taken on
his clients' behalf-and all on the dubious bet that by so doing, the system, in some
mechanistic and formalistic manner, will almost miraculously crank out justice as the out-
come."). Commitment to a specific role conception can also be a vehicle for judges to
pursue results without considering the impact decisions have on outside parties. See, e.g.,
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For example, a zealously client-centered dispute system designer
may engage in zero-sum thinking and maximize one side-their client's
interest-when designing dispute system structures irrespective of the
quality of justice or degradation to the rule of law. A dispute system
designer may seek to zealously advance their client's financial interests
by imposing a binding design structure on swaths of the public that
extinguishes the public's legal rights and provides a meaningless form
of redress with no commitment to avoid transgressing rights in the
future. In doing so, they would fail to consider the public's perspective
and fail to enact dispute resolution procedures that lead to neutral,
unbiased, and just outcomes. This zealous advocacy would impair the
legal infrastructure that supports private ordering, and it would come at
the expense of the public's ability to rely on a just legal infrastructure
that the public demands in a vibrant democracy that abides by the rule
of law.5 5
This zealously client-centered system design activity is in tension
with the aspirations of the Preamble to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, which calls for broad social responsibilities and states that
"[a] lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of
clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special
responsibility for the quality ofjustice."5 6 While the Preamble discusses
the responsibility to zealously advocate on behalf of clients, it places this
responsibility inside a broader aspiration to "seek[ ] a result advanta-
geous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest dealings
with others."5 7 In this way, the Preamble reminds lawyers that they have
a duty of integrity that extends beyond their client relationships and
that extends to third parties.
The Preamble goes on to assert that as "public citizen [s]," lawyers
are responsible for seeking to improve the law.58 It advises legal profes-
sionals to improve the quality of service of the legal system and access to
legal services.5 9 Lawyers have a duty to increase the public's confidence
in and understanding of legal institutions, and "should devote profes-
sional time and resources and use civic influence" to eliminate barriers
to justice.6 0 This section also acknowledges that the cost of legal ser-
vices can be a barrier to justice for many, and it calls on lawyers to help
remedy this problem.6 ' The Preamble later says that "[a] lawyer should
strive to . . . exemplify the legal profession's ideals of public service."6 2
Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1590 (1987) ("Fidelity
to rules and to the autonomy of a legal system, and belief in its internal coherence, can
support a judicial decisionmaker's avoidance of empathy and of his responsibility for
human pain caused by law.").
55. See Quintanilla & Avtgis, supra note 4, at 2133; cf MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILER-
PLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 15-18, 33 (2013).
56. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr pmbl. ¶ 1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016).
57. Id. at pmbl. 1 2.




62. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 7.
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Model Rule 6.1 discusses pro bono practice, and says a lawyer should
aspire to provide at least fifty hours of pro bono service annually. The
rule says lawyers should also participate in activities that "improv[e] the
law, the legal system, or the legal profession."6 3 Together, the Pream-
ble and Rule 6.1 describe a general civic and professional aspiration
and duty. However, these principles offer little guidance to lawyers who
serve in the role of civil justice designers who have clients with immedi-
ate concrete interests in developing a dispute system that deals with
streams of disputes which may be in conflict with the public's interest in
the quality of justice.
In the main, the Model Rules place primary emphasis on duties to
clients and offer little guidance or mandatory obligations about how to
design systems in light of the public's concern for a just and effective
civil justice system. Almost all the statements above are phrased in
terms of "should." According to the Preamble, "may" and "should" are
used throughout the Rules to describe permissive or discretionary
acts. 64 While the actions described above are recommended, there is
no formal mechanism for ensuring professionals in the legal system
abide by them.65 By contrast, mandates in the Rules are signaled by the
words "shall" or "shall not."66
Another limitation to the Model Rules is that often, responsibilities
to third parties are framed in terms of a duty to a client. For example,
Rule 4.4 on transactions with people who are not clients says, "[i]n rep-
resenting a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial
purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or
use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a
person."'67 By using "shall not," this rule creates a mandate about the
treatment of third parties, but it frames that conduct in terms of a law-
yer's relationships with clients. Rule 1.6 similarly places ethical deci-
sions in the context of the client relationship by making it permissible
for a lawyer to breach client confidences "to prevent reasonably certain
death or substantial bodily harm," or "to prevent the client from com-
mitting a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substan-
tial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in
furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services."68 The
ABA amended Rule 1.6 in 2003, but its use of a "may" or permissibility
standard stops short of mandating that lawyers prevent harm to
others.69
63. Id. at r. 6.1.
64. Id. at pmbl. 1 14.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at r. 4.4.
68. Id. at r. 1.6 (emphasis added).
69. Eugene R. Gaetke, Expecting Too Much and Too Little of Lawyers, 67 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 693, 727 (2006) ("To the extent that lawyers in general are viewed as not making
enough disclosures to protect non-clients' interests, the level of discretion embraced by
the new amendments' treatment of confidentiality is not likely to be the answer to the
problem."); see David Lew, Revised Model Rule 1.6: What Effect Will the New Rule Have on
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Overall, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct envision a pro-
fession that is actively engaged in serving clients, while at the same time
aspirationally engaged in public service, striving to increase access to
justice and faith in the legal system. Because the chief ethical quandary
involves lawyers creating civil justice systems within lawyer-client rela-
tionships, dispute system design processes, and institutions that affect
the public, the Model Rules offer little other than aspirational gui-
dance, rather than prohibitions on the way this design activity is
performed.
B. Legal Education, Socialization, and Concerns about Zealous Advocacy
While the Model Rules of Professional Conduct set forth the aspi-
ration that lawyers will serve as officers of the legal system, and as public
citizens having a special responsibility for the quality of justice, a grow-
ing body of work reveals that socialization into the legal profession and
the formation of professional identities may threaten these values and
ideals.70 Within law schools, legal socialization is the process by which
law students form their social and professional identities and "think like
a lawyer."7 1 Whereas research on legal socialization illuminates the
"intense and transformative impact of legal education on students'
understandings of what it means to be a lawyer,"7 2 research on profes-
sional identify formation examines the formation of lawyers' self-con-
ceptions, and the tension between serving clients and public values. In
this section, I will briefly describe John Bliss's work on public interest
drift, and findings from the Carnegie Report.73
In an analysis of "professional role distancing," John Bliss con-
trasted studies of "front-stage dynamics of law school classrooms" with
"students' back-stage experiences of the professional role within their
ongoing processes of self-construction" and sought to determine how
law students engage in the process of "role distancing," or the process
by which lawyers and law students distance their personal values from
Practicing Attorneys?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 881 (2005) (arguing that in the short-term,
the ABA's permissive standard under Rule 1.6 will likely not result in more disclosures).
70. See generally WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF
LAW 5 (2007); ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO "THINK
LIKE A LAWYER" (2007); Ronald M. Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibil-
ity: A Curricular Paradox, 4 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 247 (1979); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the
Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31 (1992); DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND
THE REPRODUCTION Or HIERARCHY (2004); ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS
36-50 (1992); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLrr-
ICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING 51-71 (2004); James C. Foster, The Cooling
Out of Law Students-Facilitating Market Cooptation of Future Lawyers, 3 L. & PoL'Y Q. 243,
243-56 (1981); Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 591 (1982); Craig Kubey, Three Years of Adjustment: Where Your Ideals Go,
JURIS DR., Dec. 1976, at 34.
71. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 70, at 5; see generally MERTZ, supra note 70.
72. John Bliss, Divided Selves: Professional Role Distancing Among Law Students and New
Lawyers in a Period of Market Crisis, 42 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 855, 861 (2017) (quoting SCI-IE-
INGOLD & SARAT, supra note 70, at 57).
73. I will leave for another day a more extensive discussion of these phenomena.
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their professional identities.7 4 He examined this phenomenon in the
context of "public interest drift," or the data showing that law students
"'drift' away from public-interest-career commitment" throughout law
school.75 Bliss summarizes research tending to show that as students
complete the socialization process and learn to think like lawyers, "they
learn to eschew moral, political, and other contextual aspects of case
analysis."7 6 Bliss attributes some of this to "professional bifurcation," or
the idea that lawyers need to separate their personal values from their
clients' interests in order to foster "'zealous advocacy' for [their] cli-
ent[s] irrespective of the client's cause."77
Moreover, the Carnegie Foundation attributed aspects of this
troubling socialization to law school pedagogy, particularly the empha-
sis on "the procedural and systematic" and the case method of teach-
ing.78 For example, the study found that "most law schools emphasize
the priority of analytic thinking, in which students learn to categorize
and discuss persons and events in highly generalized terms."7 At the
same time, law students are encouraged to discard "facts" that do not
have legal significance.80 "Students discover that to 'think like a lawyer'
means redefining messy situations of actual or potential conflict as
opportunities for advancing a client's cause through legal argument
before ajudge or through negotiation."8 1 Professors frequently discard
arguments based on "social needs or matters of justice" as falling
outside the "legal landscape." 82 In the process, students lose sight of
how their moral and personal values can be integrated into their legal
practices. In short, "students are told to set aside their desire for jus-
tice" and not let social justice-oriented concerns "cloud their legal
analyses. "83
In summary, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ultimately
delimit neither minimum standards for civil justice designers nor best
practices, let alone a positive code of ethics for legal professionals
engaged in civil justice design. Indeed, the chief difficulty with the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct is that many legal professionals
believe that their professional obligation is to zealously advance their
client's economic interests. This view may create ethical tension with
the aspiration of guarding the quality ofjustice for members of the pub-
lic. Finally, given the process of legal socialization within law schools
and in the first several years within the legal profession, the aspirations
74. See generally Bliss, supra note 72; GRANFIELD, supra note 70; Robert Granfield,
Cynicism and the Law: The Emergence of Legal Consciousness in Law School, 25J. Soc. P-1u.. 188(1994).
75. See Bliss, supra note 72.
76. Id.; see also GRANFIELD, supra note 70; Granfield, supra note 74, at 188.
77. Bliss, supra note 72, at 862.
78. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 70, at 5.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 5-6.
81. Id. at 6.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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in the preamble to the Model Rules may be endangered by the
demands of the client-centered legal profession as practiced today.
III. THE PRINCIPLE OF NEIGHBORLY MORALITY: AVOIDING HARM TO
OTHERS AND CARING FOR MEMBERS OF ONE'S COMMUNITY
Having examined the extent to which the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct delimit the conduct of legal professionals in the role of
civil justice designers and found a dearth of guidance, we next turn to
the moral and ethical principles that a professional has a responsibility
to sustain when engaged in this emerging role.
The role of civil justice designer is a newly emerging societal role
for legal professionals.84 Whenever new professional roles emerge, we
should reflect on the ethical dimensions and responsibilities of these
new roles and examine the ethical principles that apply to professionals
who engage in these new roles.85 In this section, I examine the univer-
sal moral principle of avoiding harm to members of one's community
and having compassionate regard for others, and briefly discuss the
consensus among religious and secular sources for the importance of
neighborly morality.8 6 This principle of neighborly morality will serve
as the starting point for the discussion in Part IV, which elaborates the
role ethic and responsibilities of civil justice designers.
In this regard, a basic moral intuition applies in the course of how
we as members of society are expected to relate to other members of
our communities. To clarify concepts, when speaking of ethical, I draw
distinction between the concept of ethics, which refers to specific rules
and judgments, and morality, which consists of the underlying ideas
about humans and the relationships on which those rules are based.8 7
In this sense, by morality, I mean a property of our relations with other
human beings-individuals whom we know well and also those who are
unfamiliar, as well as groups, both close and remote.88 Morality in this
way entails interactions that exist between or among humans due to
their common humanity, their mutual recognition of this fact, and
their membership in some kind of community.8 9
This basic moral precept is one of avoiding harm to others and
includes a conscious and compassionate regard for their well-being.
84. See URY ET AL., supra note 20, notes and sources.
85. See GARDNER, supra note 13, at 79-84.
86. See, e.g., A GLOBAL ETHc: THE DECLARATION OF THE PARLIAMENT OF THE
WORLD'S RELIGIONS (Hans King & KarlJosef Kuschel eds., John Bowden trans., 2006);
GARDNER, supra note 13, at 79-84.
87. See GARDNER, supra note 13, at 79-84. The terms morality and ethics have been
used differently by scholars. See also WEBB KEANE, ETHIcAL LIFE: ITS NATURAL AND SocIAL
HISTORIES 18-19 (2016) ("Whereas morality deals with such questions as what one should
do next, ethics concerns a manner of life-not momentary events but something that
unfolds over the long term and is likely to vary according to one's circumstances. Viewed
from this perspective, the trolley problem addresses an issue of morality, and the Kluane
rabbit hunters, the nature of ethics. Ethics is thus less about decisions and the rules that
should govern them than about virtues . . . .")
88. See GARDNER, supra note 13, at 79-84.
89. See id. at 82.
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The essence of this neighborly morality is that people's behavior toward
others should be guided by the way they wish others to behave toward
them. In particular, one should refrain from actions one wishes others
not to commit against oneself. In this way, the Golden Rule echoes
across cultures and experiences as a near-universal mandate on how to
treat others. The Golden Rule emphasizes treating others as one wishes
to be treated, and in particular serves to remind the observer to treat
others of a lower "station" with respect.90 The Golden Rule is not lim-
ited to our treatment of those people we know and interact with most
closely. "[M]odern ethics has stressed the equal, basic value of each
individual, and, hence, the obligation to consider remote as well as
proximate others in thinking about what to do.""
The Golden Rule can be found reflected within major world reli-
gions, including Judeo-Christian and Chinese religious texts.92 As
quoted in the declaration of the parliament of the world religions:
There is a principle which is found and has persisted in many
religious and ethical traditions of humankind for thousands of
years: What you do not wish done to yourself, do not do to others!
Or in positive terms: What you wish done to yourself, do to others!
This should be the irrevocable, unconditional norm for all areas
of life, for families and communities, for races, nations and
religions.9 3
These major world religions emphasize that moral conduct entails
avoiding harm toward others and behaving with compassion. Whether
it is in scriptural prescriptions or in the ideal or exemplary life that is
admired across world religions, avoiding harm to others and behaving
with compassion to those within one's community is a near universal
basis for living a good life.9 4
In Judaism, the Ten Commandments include an ethic of restraint:
a morality that prevents one from acting on one's immediate impulses,
such as aversion and greed, and has prohibitions against murder, adul-
tery, and theft, for example. Rabbi Hillel in the 1st century B.C. noted
the centrality of this ethic of care when stating, "[w]hat is hateful to
you, do not do to your neighbor: that is the whole Torah, while the rest
is commentary thereof; go and learn it."9 5
In Christianity, in the Gospel of SaintJohn, "[m]y command is this:
Love each other."96 In the sermon of the Mount, "[a]ll things whatso-
90. SeeJEFFREY WATT'LEs, THE GOLDEN RULE 172-73 (1996).
91. See id. at 172.
92. See generally id.
93. See A GLOBAL ET-ne: THE DECLARATION OF THE PARLIAMENT OF THE WORLD'S
RELIGIONS, supra note 86, at 23.
94. See generally THE DALAI LAMA, TowARD A TRUE INSHIP OF FAITI-IS: How THE
WoRLD'S RELIGIONS CAN COME TOGETHER (2010).
95. 1 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD: TRACTATE SHABBATI-1 § 31a (I. Epstein, ed., H.
Freedman, trans.), https://halakhah.com/shabbath/index.html. See also Leviticus 19:17-
18 (King James) ("Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thine heart: ... but thou shall love thy
neighbor as thyself.").
96. John 15:12-18 (New International).
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ever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this
is the law and the prophets."9 7 "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thy-
self." 98 In the Sermon on the Plain, in Luke, "[d]o to others as you
would have them do to you."99
In Hinduism, there is a sense of a universal welfare for all beings,
"[s] eers whose impurities have been destroyed, whose doubts have been
dispelled, who have restrained themselves, who delight in the welfare of
all beings, reach the nirvana of Brahman." 00 "One should never do
that to another which one regards as injurious to one's own self. This,
in brief, is the rule of Righteousness. One by acting in a different way
by yielding to desire, becomes guilty of unrighteousness."ol
So too in Islam, the Prophet Muhammad said, "[n]one of you
[truly] believes until he wishes for his brother what he wishes for him-
self." 0 2 Similarly, a man once asked the Prophet Muhammad what was
the best thing in Islam, who replied, "[t]o feed (the poor) and greet
those whom you know and those whom you do not know." 0 3
In Buddhism, "[i]n five ways should a clansman minister to his
friends and familiars-by generosity, courtesy, benevolence, by treating
them as he treats himself, and by being as good as his word." 104 Since
others too care for their own selves, those who care for themselves
should not hurt others. In Jainism, "a man should wander about treat-
ing all creatures as he himself would be treated." 0 5
In Confucianism, "[o] ne word which sums up the basis of all good
conduct ... loving kindness. Do not do to others what you would not
like yourself." 0 6 So too in The Analects, "Is there any single saying,"
asked Tzu Kung, "that one can act upon all day and every day?" The
Master replied: "Never do to others what you would not like them to do
to you."' 0 7 In another dialogue on the thread running through the
97. Matthew 7:12 (King James).
98. Leviticus 19:18 (King James).
99. Luke 6:31 (New International).
100. THE BHAGAVAD GITA 5:25 (W.J. Johnson trans. 1994); see also id. at 3:20 ("Look-
ing only to what maintains the world, you too must act."); id. at 12:13 ("Without hatred
for any creature, friendly and compassionate, free from possessiveness and egoism"); id.
at 16:2 ("Non-violence, truthfulness, freedom from anger, renunciation, tranquility,
absence of calumny, compassion for creatures, freedom from greed, gentleness, modesty,
steadiness").
101. MAHABHARATA, ANUSANA PARVA 113 (Kisari Mohan Ganguli trans. 1896), http:/
/www.sacred-texts.com/hin/ml3/ml3b078.htm. See also Yuddha Kanda, in THE RAMA-
YANA OF VALMIKI 331-32 (Hari Prasad Shastri trans., 3d ed. 1976) ("A superior being does
not render evil for evil; this is a maxim one should observe; the ornament of virtuous
persons is their conduct. One should never harm the wicked, or the good, or even
criminals meriting death. A noble soul will ever exercise compassion, even toward those
who enjoy injuring others ..... ).
102. AN-NAWAWI, FORTY HADrrH (Ezzeddin Ibrahim & Denys Johnson-Davies trans.
1997). In the Qur'an, God is named the Compassionate and the Merciful.
103. SAHIH xAL-BUKHARi loc. 12, (ebook) https://sunnah.com/bukhari/2.
104. UDANAVARGA 5:20 (Thupten Jinpa, trans.).
105. JAINA SuTRsAs, SOTRAKIUTA?GA 1.11:33 (Hermann Jacobi trans., vol. 35, 1895)
(ebook) http://www.sacred-texts.com/jai/sbe45/sbe 4 559 .htm.
106. THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUs 15:23 (Arthur Waley trans., 1989).
107. Id.
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doctrines, Tseng Tsu explained, " [o]ur Master's Way is simply this: Loy-
alty, consideration."' 0 8
This principle of neighborly morality, moreover, is woven through-
out the great works and canon of Western philosophical thought. For
example, Aristotle described our social relationships as a series of con-
centric social circles, beginning at the center with self-love, then closest
friends and family, followed by fellow citizens, and finally, to the circle
of friendship that includes every human being. Friends have similar
views and activities, so they will for each other what they will for them-
selves. 109 Friendship includes goodwill-wishing good for the other, as
for the other's sake; and a friend is also motivated to act to do good to
his or her friend. 0 "To be friends, then, they must be mutually recog-
nized as bearing goodwill and wishing well to each other .... "Ill In
the outer circles of fellow citizens and all human beings, Aristotle's
ideas of restoring justice through proper proportion and of an attitude
of goodwill come into play.1 12
Immanuel Kant writes about duty-including duty toward others-
as separate from wants or desires. Rational, principled thinking gives
way to what is right and must therefore be done, regardless of what the
actor or recipient wants.113 For Kant, the hallmarks of goodwill and a
good person are decisions based on moral law." 4 Kant believed that
rational thinking rooted in moral law could be governed by a Categori-
cal Imperative: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at
the same time will that it should become a universal law."" 5 The Cate-
gorical Imperative in this form provides a formula for assessing all other
rules or moral mandates. Kant calls upon an actor to begin with a
maxim that states her reasoning for a given course of action, and then
to recast it as a universal law of nature, which all actors must adhere to.
If the maxim is still conceivable and the actor rationally would or could
still act on it as a universal law, then it is morally sound.11 6 While Kant
and John Stuart Mill are exemplars for different forms of philosophical
(e.g., deontological vs. utilitarian) thought, J.S. Mill concluded that the
Golden Rule converged with utilitarianism. In Utilitarianism, he wrote,
"[t]o do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as one-
self, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality."" 7
108. Id. at 4:15. Zoroastrianism: That nature only is good what it shall not do unto
another whatever is not good for its own self
109. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in 9 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 407(W.D. Ross trans., 1952).
110. See id.
111. See id. See also DIOGENES LAEwrius, LIVES AND OPINIONS Or EMINENT PHILOSO-
PHERS 188 (H.G. Bohn ed., C.D. Yonge trans. 1853).
112. See Aristotle, supra note 109.
113. IMMANUEL KANT, ETHICAL PHILoSoPHY 429-33 (James W. Ellington trans.
1983).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 421.
116. Id.
117. JOHN STUART MILL & JEREMY BENTHAM, UTILITARIANISM AND) OTHER EssAYs 288(Alan Ryan ed. 1987).
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IV. THE ROLE ETHIC AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF CIVIL JUSTICE
DESIGNERS: EXCELLENCE, ENGAGEMENT,
AND ETHICAL CONDUCT
While neighborly morality, or the Golden Rule, offers a moral com-
pass to guide interactions between those who share membership in a
community, ethics refers to a set of principles and practices applying to
those who occupy roles within a complex and highly differentiated soci-
ety. 8 In the realm of morality, one thinks of oneself as a member of a
community and about one's interactions with other members of this
community, whereas in the realm of role ethics, one thinks of oneself as
occupying a role and about the responsibilities applying to persons
within this role.1 19
As elaborated in Part II, the professional standards and principles
regulating legal professionals who serve as civil justice designers have
not yet fully emerged.1 20 Yet, a growing number of lawyers now engage
in civil justice design, and this trend will continue. 12 1 Until the role
ethic of these civil justice designers is defined, the chief difficulty will be
the tension between, on the one hand, serving clients who wish to maxi-
mize their own selfish interests in the design of a dispute system and, on
the other, the public's interest in a civil justice system and in dispute
systems that are fair, just, and legitimate.
Professors Howard Gardner, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, and William
Damon have developed an evidence-based framework for understand-
ing the responsibilities that apply to professionals who occupy roles in
society and how these professionals can perform these roles ethically.12 2
Their framework on good work contains three analytical criteria: excel-
lence, engagement, and ethics.123 Under this framework, good work is
excellent, i.e., the work meets the technical standards of the relevant pro-
fession. Good work is engaging, i.e., the work is personally meaningful.
Carrying out good work over a career proves too difficult unless the
work is inviting and meaningful to the practitioner. Finally, good work
is ethical, i.e., the work is carried out in a responsible, ethical manner.
That is, a professional meeting the role ethics of a particular role con-
stantly interrogates herself about what it means to be responsible in that
role, seeks to behave in that way, and attempts to admit her failings and
correct course.1 24 This framework, and the three analytical criteria of
excellence, engagement, and ethics are an important vehicle for trans-
lating the moral intuitions of neighborly morality into a role ethic that
applies to civil justice designers.
To begin, in the realm of excellence, civil justice designers will
become experts in the process of dispute system design, including
118. See GARDNER, supra note 13, at 79-84.
119. See id.
120. See text and notes referenced supra Part II.
121. See text and notes referenced supra Part I.
122. See GARDNER, supra note 13, at 88-94.
123. See id.
124. See id.
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learning frameworks that help structure analyses of conflict streams and
dispute systems, along with the multiple process options and variations
available when constructing systems that resolve streams of disputes.1 25
Civil justice designers will investigate the needs, aspirations, and con-
cerns of stakeholders and affected parties, including the particular
organizations, communities, cultures, histories and dynamics of dis-
putes.1 2 6 Civiljustice designers should carefully reflect on whether the
design that they seek to develop can actually accomplish what it was
designed to do and how to evaluate and adapt systems as conditions
change.1 27 Excellence would entail knowledge about social psychology
and about the social psychology of experienced justice; sociological and
psychological accounts of organizational dynamics and conflict theory;
knowledge of research methodologies for assessment; and a growth
mindset that strives to learn these areas of knowledge, civil justice
design, and stakeholder interests, aspirations, concerns, and needs.128
Moreover, a civil justice designer will gather data and develop
hypotheses,1 2 9 while at the same time embracing ambiguity as she
learns from stakeholders and affected communities in a particular pro-
ject. She would develop and discard theories and iterate and test pilots
when developing possible interventions.
In the realm of engagement, civil justice designers will ensure that
stakeholders, affected communities, and users of any system have input
when creating a dispute system and have the ability to provide feedback
about the effectiveness of the dispute system.o3 0 Civiljustice designers
125. See URY ET AL., supfra note 20, at 41-43; see generally ROGERS ET. AL., supra note
26; AmsLER ET. AL., Sufra note 26; Quintanilla, supra note 1, at 756-58.
126. See Quintanilla, supra note 1, at 756-58; Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Designing
justice: Legal Institutions and Other Systems for Managing Conflict, 24 O-o ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 1, 4-6 (2008) (describing how Elinor Ostrom's institutional analysis framework
can be applied to understand the multiple layers of dispute system design, including the
action situation, the "(1) rules used by participants to order their relationships, (2) the
attributes of the biophysical world that are acted upon in these arenas, and (3) the structure
of the more general community within which any particular arena is placed").
127. See Quintanilla, supra note 1, at 756-58; Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consen-
sus Builder, supra note 20, 108-109 (arguing that civil justice designers "should attempt to
ensure that decisions ... are implementable and that contingencies and future processes
have been considered . . . . Effective process experts should also assist the parties in
developing plans for contingencies or uncertainties in agreements or decisions and pro-
vide for future deliberative or dispute-resolution processes").
128. See Quintanilla, supra note 1, at 756-58.; see generally AMSLER FT AL., supra note
26; Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder, supra note 20, 81-83.
129. See Quintanilla, supra note 1, at 756-58; AmSLER FT AL., supra note 26, at Chap-
ter 5 (Evaluating Dispute System Design); see also Bingham, supra note 126, 48-50 (argu-
ing that more data is needed to measure justice).
130. See Quintanilla, supra note 1, at 756-58; Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consen-
sus Builder, supra note 20, at 103 ("Ensuring that a consensus-building process is legitimate
by inviting all appropriate stakeholders is widely regarded as the key to the success of such
processes and distinguishes such a deliberative democratic process from more conven-
tional lawsuits or transactional matters."); Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus
Builder, supra note 20, at 106 ("All identified stakeholders, whether direct constituents or
in represented capacities, should have adequate opportunities to be heard and to partici-
pate in proceedings that may result in decisions affecting them. Parties and stakeholders
should be able to choose representatives to represent or express their interests."); see also
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will ensure that any process designed can be adequately explained to
and understood by its users. 13' They should take responsibility for
implementation and evaluation. They should be engaged when design-
ing a system, seeking to truly understand and know the causes and con-
ditions that may foster aspirations and fulfill human well-being, or that
may create concerns and harm.13 2 Drawing on this understanding,
they would aspire to help others resolve problems when possible in
peaceful and harmonious ways.
In the realm of ethics, while there is as yet no binding professional
ethical code,1 33 civil justice designers should nonetheless avoid harm-
ing the public, stakeholders, and affected members of the commu-
nity.134 They would seek to be compassionate toward all people
affected by any proposed intervention and design. Civil justice design-
ers should not become tools of a client that wants to use civil justice
design to achieve inappropriate or illegitimate ends. Civil justice
designers will ensure that their conduct ensures at minimum:13 5 (1)
that any dispute system provides the parties with self-determination, (2)
that any dispute system is transparent and effectively communicated to
ensure the parties provide their informed consent before entering the
process, 136 including disclosure of any interests or relationships that
Bingham, supra note 126, at 36 (arguing that voice contributes to a sense of justice);
COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 27, at 64 ("Feedback as it relates to interest-based
conflict management systems design requires both the ability and the willingness to ask
how well things are working, to learn about what is not working, and to pursue making
changes where necessary.").
131. See Bingham, supra note 126, at 38-39 (arguing that the ability of explanations,
provided without ulterior motives, contribute to a sense of justice); URY ET AL., supra note
20, at 41-43; RocERS ET AL., supra note 26; AMSLER ET AL., supra note 26; Quintanilla, supra
note 1, at 756-58.
132. See COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 27, at 59 ("The first principle, put-
ting the focus on interests, really means that the starting point in organizational conflict
management becomes the statement, clarification, and illumination of the issue at hand
from the perspective of the needs and concerns from the interest groups. In other words,
rather than initially seeking various means to cover up the core concerns that give rise to
the dispute through positions (one party's idea of a solution) and other strategies to mask
the real problem or concern, the conflict management system is designed to provide
processes at the outset that promote and support the identification of such core
concerns.").
133. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 43, at 205. There are, however, non-binding
principles for ADR Provider Organizations. See CPR-GEORGETOWN COMMISSION ON ETHICS
AND STANDARDS OF PRACTICE IN ADR, PRINCIPLES FOR ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS
(2002), https://www.cpradr.org/resource-center/protocols-guidelines/ethics-codes/
principles-for-adr-provider-organizations; see also MYRNA C. ADAMS ET AL., SOCIETY OF PRO-
FESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, DESIGNING INTEGRATED CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYS-
TEMs-GUIDELINES FOR PRACTITIONERS AND DECISION MAKERS IN ORGANIZATIONS (2001).
134. See AMSLER ET AL., supra note 26, at Chapter 6 (Ethics in System Design).
135. See generally AMSLER ET AL, supra note 26, at Chapter 6 (Ethics in System
Design); Susan Nauss Exon, Ethics and Online Dispute Resolution: From Evolution to Revolu-
tion, 32 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 609 (2017).
136. See Dale C. Hetzler & Ashley Nicole Speth, Future Dispute System Design: Ethical
Imperatives, Millennial and Beyond, 24 O-uo ST. J. ON Disr. RESOL. 131 (2008). See, e.g.,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ET AL., MODEL STANDARDS FOR MEDIATORS § VI.B (2005);
INTERNATIONAL OMBUDSMAN ASSOCIATION, IOA BEST PRACTICES: A SUPPLEMENT TO IOA's
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE § 4.1 (3d ed. 2009).
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may affect the impartiality or independence of actors within the system,
(3) that any dispute system reduces the actual and apparent conflicts of
interest and commitment affecting the independence, neutrality, and
impartiality of the system,' 3 7 (4) that any dispute system does not
undermine legal rights, (5) that any dispute system takes reasonable
steps to protect the appropriate level of confidentiality, and (6) that any
dispute system maintains quality and effectiveness while keeping the
cost and time to users as low as possible.13 8 They must ensure that their
proposed civil justice design system does not systematically discriminate
against or harm particular individuals.13 9 They would exhibit certain
qualities: empathy; compassion; a degree of creative confidence, aban-
doning the belief that problems cannot be solved; and a willingness to
share feedback and improve in light of feedback from stakeholders and
perspective taking.' 40 To discharge their role ethically, civil justice
designers would place the responsibility to serve the public over their
own self-interest or self-gain.
The civil justice designer meeting the first criterion of this role
ethic will be technically excellent-she will know the various concepts
and methods for engaging in civil justice design and the theories of
psychology and behavioral science relevant for designing systems that
resolve streams of conflict. The civil justice designer meeting the sec-
ond criterion of the role ethic will be engaged-she will care about
what happens to members of the public affected by her design. Lastly,
a civil justice designer meeting the final criterion of this role ethic will
be ethical. She will avoid harming others and will serve the public over
her own self-interest or self-gain. In broad brush strokes, these are the
three criteria that apply to legal professionals who serve in the role of
civil justice designer.
V. THE ETHICAL PRACTICE OF HUMAN-CENTERED CfVIL JUSTICE DESIGN
In this section, we introduce the process of human-centered civil
justice designl41 and discuss how this ethical practice allows legal pro-
fessionals to meet their role ethic and achieve excellence, engagement,
and ethics when serving as a civil justice designer.
To begin, the practice of human-centered civil justice design
weaves knowledge and best practices about design systems that exem-
plify excellence when engaging in the role of civil justice designer,
137. See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns in Employment Arbitra-
tion: A Look at Actual Cases, 47 LAn. L.J. 108, 116-117 (1996); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule
3.859(c) (2009) ("The amount or nature of a mediator's fee must not be made contin-
gent on the outcome of the mediation."); see generally Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitra-
tion: The Repeat Player Affect, 1 EMI'. Rrs. & EMP. PoL'YJ. 189 (1997).
138. Jo DeMars, Susan Nauss Exon, Kimbelee K. Kovach, & Colin Rule, Virtual Vir-
tues: Ethical Considerations for Online Dispute Resolution Practice, DisP. REso. MAG. (Fall
2010), at 6-10.
139. Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder, supra note 20, at 109; see also
Bingham, supra note 21, at 18-19.
140. Bingham, supra note 21, at 39 (discussing "interpersonal justice").
141. See generally Quintanilla, supra note 1.
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while at the same time orienting the professional toward engaging with
affected communities in an ethical manner. For example, the practice
of human-centered civil justice design is rooted in human experiences
with the processes, systems, people, and environments encountered
when navigating the civil justice system and how these experiences
interact with the entangled web of hardships and legal adversities peo-
ple face every day.1 4 2 Human-centered civil justice designers empathize
and immerse themselves with intended beneficiaries and stakeholders
(e.g., parties, lawyers, judges, and members of the public) through
observation and interviews to uncover their needs and experiences,
embracing and identifying those needs in order to determine stake-
holders' interests and goals before narrowing and identifying the
problems to be solved. These designers ideate and brainstorm a range
of human-centered solutions before winnowing them down based on
feasibility and financial viability. In this way, when legal professionals
apply the practice of human-centered civil justice design they engage
the role with excellence, engagement, and ethics.
Regarding these three criteria, human-centered civil justice design
synthesizes insights and practices from two interdisciplinary strands:
human-centered design thinkingl 43 and dispute system design.1 44
Human-centered design thinking provides a framework for designing.
with communities affected by problems, allowing designers to deeply
understand the people that they seek to serve when creating solutions
stemming from the community's needs. 14 5 The approach is bottom-up,
rather than top-down, and begins with the premise that the people who
confront problems are the ones who hold the key to answering
them.' 4 6 Designers closely observe how people behave; how features
and cues within environments affect thoughts, emotions, and behaviors
(i.e., psychological experiences); and the meaning people make from
the environments and the processes they encounter.
Regarding the criterion of excellence, human-centered civil justice
design is a practice that seeks to improve our civil justice system. The
approach aspires to promote a civil justice system that is experienced by
the public as "just, speedy, and inexpensive"l 47 and to prevent "wicked
problems," including unintended consequences stemming from ill-
142. See Quintanilla, supra note 1, at 756-58; for a discussion of the human-cen-
tered design approach to problem solving, see TIM BROWN & BARRY KA7z, CHANGE By
DESIGN: How DESIGN THINKING TRANsFoRMs ORGANIZATIONS AND INSPIRES INNOVATION
3-4, 50-53 (2009); IDEO.oRG, THE FIELD GUIDE TO HUMAN-CENTERED DESIGN 9-14, 71-73
(2015); Paul Brest, Nadia Roumani & Jason Bade, Problem Solving, Human-Centered Design,
and Strategic Processes, STANFORD PACS (2015), http://pacscenter.stanford.edu/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2015/09/Download-the-full-article-here.pdf; Tim Brown, Design Thinking,
I-IARv. Bus. REV. (Jun. 2008), https://hbr.org/2008/ 06/design-thinking.
143. See Quintanilla, supra note 1, at 756-58.
144. See id.
145. See BROWN & KATz, supra note 142, at 39-40; IDEO.oRG, supra note 142, at 9;
BREST ET AL., supra note 142, at 3; Brown, supra note 142, at 86.
146. See, e.g., MARGARET GERTEIS ET AL., Ti-ROUGH THE PATIENT's EYES: UNDERSTAND-
ING AND PROMOTING PATIENT-CENTERED CARE 5 (1993) (describing patient-centered
medicine as "an approach that consciously adopts the patient's perspective").
147. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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crafted system design changes. 4 8 Civil justice designers realize these
aspirations by harnessing the best practices of human-centered design
and dispute system design. These best practices include: (1) uncover-
ing the public's varied needs, goals, and concerns to identify the causes,
conditions, and nature of problems and the extent to which the
existing civil justice system departs from the public's needs and aspira-
tions; and (2) iterating and conducting pilots of proposed civil justice
interventions before formally redesigning the civil justice system.
Moreover, human-centered civil justice designers move through
three overlapping spaces when designing an intervention: inspiration,
ideation, and implementation. '4 Inspiration is the opportunity that moti-
vates the search for solutions.' 5 0 The inspiration stage entails identify-
ing key beneficiaries and stakeholders (i.e., people and institutions that
contribute to problems or solutions) and empathizing with them
through direct observation, ethnography, surveys, psychological studies,
and other forms of accessing their experiences and perspective-tak-
ing.1 5 ' Ater designers identify stakeholders, they narrow the number
of needs the specific project will address. Next, in the ideation stage,
designers translate these insights and generate, develop, and test ideas,
always considering the criteria of desirability, feasibility, and viability.15 2
Finally, in the implementation stage, designers develop the best ideas into
a concrete plan of action.
Regarding the criterion of engagement, in the inspiration stage,
human-centered civil justice designers seek to empathize with the many
beneficiaries and stakeholders of the civil justice system, conferring on
them standing, dignity, and respect by ensuring that their needs, goals,
and concerns are heard and considered.s5 3 These beneficiaries and
148. See Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of Plan-
ning, 4 PoL'Y SCI. 155, 161 (1973) ("[Y]ou may agree that it becomes morally objectiona-
ble for the planner to treat a wicked problem as though it were a tame one, or to tame a
wicked problem prematurely, or to refuse to recognize the inherent wickedness of social
problems."); Richard Buchanan, Wicked Problems in Design Thinking, 8 DESIGN ISSUES 5,
15-16 (1992).
149. These are overlapping spaces rather than sequential stages of a lockstep meth-
odology. The reason for the iterative, nonlinear nature is that design thinking is funda-
mentally an exploratory process; it will invariably make unexpected discoveries. See alo
BREST ET AL., supra note 142, at 26.
150. See BROWN & KATz, supra note 142, at 16; IDEO.oRG, supra note 142, at 29.
151. See, e.g., Dorothy Leonard & Jeffrey F. Rayport, Spark Innovation Through
Empathetic Design, Harv. Bus. Rev. 102, 104 (1997) (describing empathic user-centered
design as a process that involves "gathering, analyzing, and applying information gleaned
from observation in the field"); FRANK E. RrIrER ET AL., FOUNDATIONS FOR DESIGNING
USER-CENTERED SYSTEMS: WI-iAr SYSTEMs DESIGNERS NEED TO KNOw AnOUT PEOPLE 4
(2014) (advocating a theory of systems design that includes "[r]eflection and experimen-
tation with potential users of the system . . . throughout the design and development
process").
152. BROWN & KATz, supra note 142, at 16; IDEO.oRG, supra note 142, at 75.
153. This approach has been successful in the medical context. A traditional
patient-centered model of treatment consists of six interconnected components that
make doctors partners with their patients in diagnosis and treatment:(1) exploring both
the disease and illness experience; (2) understanding the whole person; (3) finding com-
mon ground regarding management; (4) incorporating prevention and health promo-
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stakeholders include parties to disputes, lawyers, judges, court adminis-
trators, and members of the public.15 4 By examining the way in which
people experience justice as well as the justiciable hardships people
face, civil justice designers uncover the needs, concerns, and goals of
stakeholders (which may conflict), as well as the meaning people make
of experiences in the civil justice system.15 5 This understanding may be
collected through observation, interviews, surveys, focus groups, deep
immersion within communities, and psychological and behavioral stud-
ies of stakeholder experiences.' 56
Next, in the ideation stage, human-centered civil justice designers
involve stakeholders at multiple points in the design process, including
brainstorming, evaluating, and piloting. This pluralism allows diverse
perspectives to emerge and ensures that any civil justice intervention is
balanced among the many process values promoted by the civil justice
system. Finally, human-centered civil justice design is optimistic and
humble, creating pilots in the implementation stage and testing these
tion; (5) enhancing the patient-doctor relationship; and (6) being realistic. For example,
a doctor who practices patient-centered care will involve patients in the decisionmaking
process, make sure patients feel fully informed, treat patients' physical discomfort, and
provide emotional support. GERTEIS ET AL., supra note 146, at 5-11. Studies suggest that
there is a relationship between patient-centered care and positive patient outcomes,
which may also be related to a patient's (1) "trust;" (2) "adherence to recommended
treatment;" and (3) "continuity with health care providers." Mark Meterko et al., Mortality
Among Patients with Acute Myocardial Infarction: The Influences of Patient-Centered Care and
Evidence-Based Medicine, 45 HEALTH SERV. Rss. 1188, 1189 (2010).
154. Each of these populations will have different perspectives that will cast light
when learning the needs and concerns of the public and the way in which our civil justice
design is experienced. Amartya Sen has reasoned about the importance of including the
"impartial spectator," when addressing justice dilemmas, which in this context I take as
including impartial, non-party members of the public who may have previously or who
may in the future encounter and navigate the civil justice system. See AMARTYA K. SEN,
THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 44-46 (2009).
155. One way in which we come to know the idea ofjustice is by observing justice.
and injustice in the world around us. See Aristotle, Physics, in 8 GRIUJ BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 259, 259 (W. D. Ross trans., 1952) ("When the objects of an inquiry, in
any department, have principles, conditions, or elements, it is through acquaintance with
these that knowledge, that is to say scientific knowledge, is attained."); see alsoJohn Locke,
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in 35 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 93,
121 (W. D. Ross trans., 1952) ("All ideas come from sensation or reflection."); George
Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles ofHuman Knowledge, in 35 GREAT BOOKS OF TH-E
WESTERN WORLD 401, 413 (W. D. Ross trans., 1952) ("[T]he existence of an idea consists
in being perceived."); David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, in 35 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 449, 457 (W. D. Ross trans., 1952) ("When we entertain, therefore, any
suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but
too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived?
And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion.") (emphasis
deleted).
156. This approach can help design teams define and understand problems in a
way that the beneficiaries and stakeholders may not be able to articulate. For example, in
the business context, a consulting group observed consumers who carried both cell
phones and beepers and realized that the consumers were using the combination as a way
to screen calls-they would give special beeper codes to people whose calls they wanted to
screen. From that observation, the consultants were able to realize a consumer "need for
filtering capabilities on cell phones." Leonard & Rayport, supra note 151, at 106.
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interventions with randomized controlled trials (RCTs) before integrat-
ing civil justice interventions more broadly.
By engaging in this iterative, bottom-up, pluralistic, and incremen-
tal process, human-centered civil justice designers can better avoid the
wicked system problems and unintended consequences that befall less
reflective design processes, achieving excellence in their role. RCTs
offer an important benefit for civil justice designers who seek to isolate
the causal effects of their system design interventions-and the mecha-
nisms that undergird these effects. In this regard, piloting and imple-
menting incremental design changes with RCTs would reveal whether
interventions truly address human needs and aspirations-examining
gaps between law in the books and law in action' 5 -without uninten-
tionally creating wicked system problems that diminish experiences of
justice, unreasonably increase costs or delays, or frustrate access to
justice. 5 8
Throughout this process, designers harness pilots and prototypes
to develop insight from stakeholders regarding the causes, conditions,
and nature of civil justice problems. These pilots and prototypes are
empirically tested with RCTs to explore the system-wide effects of any
proposed intervention. Human-centered civil justice design accommo-
dates the reality of our dynamic civil justice system and seeks to recon-
cile and promote diverse process values that are at times in tension with
each other, such as efficiency and promoting both the opportunity to
participate and human dignity.' 59
Human-centered civil justice designers draw from psychological
and behavioral science on how members of the public experience the
civil justice system and their encounters with court officials, including
psychological science on procedural justice and distributive justice. Jus-
tice researchers have demonstrated that experiences of injustice erode
the public's beliefs about the legitimacy of the civil justice system,
157. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 (1910);
Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic furisprudence-The Next Step, 30 ConUM. L. REv. 431, 457-59
(1930). This process of piloting and revising is crucial to any student-centered or learner-
centered approach in education, for example. Because a student-centered approach
seeks to tailor educational processes based on empirical and theoretical knowledge of
students' cognitive development and individual learning styles, student-centered educa-
tors must open themselves up to feedback from students and must be willing to adjust
their processes when they realize that their pedagogical techniques are not working for
students. STUDENT-CENTERED LEARNING: NINE CLASSROOMS IN AcIoN 186-88 (Bill Nave
ed. 2015).
158. See Rittel & Webber, supra note 148, at 163 ("With wicked problems, . . . any
solution, after being implemented, will generate waves of consequences over an
extended-virtually an unbounded-period of time. Moreover, the next day's conse-
quences of the solution may yield utterly undesirable repercussions which outweigh the
intended advantages or the advantages accomplished hitherto. In such cases, one would
have been better off if the plan had never been carried out.").
159. See Quintanilla, supra note 1, at 756-58; see generally Frank I. Michelman, The
Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights-Part 1, 6 DUKE L.J.
1153, 1171-77 (1973).
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whereas experiences of justice foster beliefs about legitimacy. 160
Indeed, decades of research reveals that a sense of justice powerfully
influences compliance with legal decrees, 16 1 cooperation with legal
authorities,16 2 and engagement in other pro-social,163 participatory,1 64
and democratic behaviors.' 65 These plural effects nourish a vibrant
American democracy.1 66 The public's experiences of justice are, there-
fore, central to human-centered civil justice design. These designers
also draw from research on how altering features of rules, processes,
and dispute resolution facilitates pro-social behavior, cooperation, and
intergroup harmony, thereby allowing humans to achieve their full
potential and to flourish.
Finally, with regard to the criterion of ethical conduct, human-cen-
tered civil justice design integrates and reconciles three overlapping cri-
teria: desirability (i.e., what meets stakeholders' needs and aspirations),
feasibility (i.e., what is technologically possible within the foreseeable
future), and viability (i.e., what is financially sustainable). 167 The
approach begins with humans-their needs, aims, and fears-and
uncovers what is desirable, imbuing innovation and problem-solving
with a human-centered ethos. The approach requires a thorough
empirical understanding, through direct observation, of what people
need in their lives and what they like or dislike about particular prac-
tices and institutions.' 6 8 Human-centered design seeks to create a
160. See Quintanilla, supra note 1, at 772-74; see, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Psychological
Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 375, 379-80 (2006); Kris-
tina Murphy et al., Nurturing Regulatory Compliance: Is Proceduraljustice Effective When People
Question the Legitimacy of the Law?, 3 REc. & GOVERNANCE 1, 2-5 (2009).
161. See Quintanilla, supra note 1, at 772-74; see, e.g., Tom R. TYLER, WHiy PEOPLE
OlBEY THE LAW 161-69 (2006).
162. See Quintanilla, supra note 1, at 772-74; see, e.g., Betsy Stanko et al., A Golden
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range of options that are technologically feasible in meeting human
needs 169 and examines alternatives for solutions that are financially
viable. 7 0
In this regard, the goal of human-centered civil justice design is to
guide in the ceaseless, compassionate evolution of a civil justice system
that benefits humanity. It applies psychological and behavioral
research on human needs, limitations, capabilities, and potential in the
design of the civil justice system.' 7 1 The approach focuses on human
beings; their interactions with one another within the civil justice sys-
tem; their experiences with the processes, systems, and environments
they encounter when navigating the civil justice system; and how these
experiences interact with the entangled web of hardships and legal
adversities they face in the everyday. Civil justice designers investigate
how humans respond to features of the civil justice system in particular
contexts.' 7 2 This information serves as the basis for predicting the
probable effects of design alternatives and proposing system design rec-
ommendations. Civil justice designers also harness pilots and RCTs to
test and incrementally apply design recommendations. When pilots
and RCTs reveal the causal effects of a design change, an innovation
may be more broadly adopted. Civil justice designers monitor and eval-
uate the influence of improvements to ensure the intended aims and
benefits manifest in particular contexts. Given that the civil justice sys-
tem is dynamic, prior interventions may reveal the need for subsequent
interventions. In this way, human-centered civil justice design is a
ceaseless process that facilitates experiences of justice and addresses
legal needs that interact with social, financial, and environmental cir-
cumstances to threaten human well-being.
CONCLUSION
In closing, the ethical practice of human-centered civil justice
design promotes human flourishing and nourishes democratic institu-
tions. When legal professionals engage in the practice of human-cen-
tered civil justice design, they satisfy the responsibilities that emanate
from their role as system designers, and meet the three criteria of their
role ethic: excellence, engagement, and ethical conduct. Human-cen-
tered civil justice design puts into practice a form of neighborly moral-
ity that prevents democratic degradation and erosions of the civil justice
system that threaten the vitality of our legal institutions. The ethical
practice of human-centered civil justice design truly empathizes with
169. See BROWN & KATZ, supra note 142, at 18-19.
170. Id.
171. In this way, human-centered civil justice design shares much in common with
the human factors approach in engineering and design. See generally MARK S. SANDERS &
ERNEST J. MCCORMICK, HUMAN FACTORS IN ENGINEERING AND DESIGN (7th ed. 1993).
172. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARv. L. REv. 1222, 1237 (1931) (discussing "[t]he belief in the worthwhileness of group-
ing cases and legal situations into narrower categories than has been the practices in the
past. This is connected with the distrust of verbally simple rules-which so often cover
dissimilar and non-simple fact situations").
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the beneficiaries and users of the civil justice system and seeks to learn
their needs and potential and understand their perspectives. This prac-
tice aspires to promote human dignity and human fulfillment and to
design the continual growth, justness, and achievement of our demo-
cratic institutions. These aims and societal values are truly fragile and
easily decay when norms and institutions decline. Legal professionals
who inhabit the new societal role of civil justice designer must balance
the interests of their client with the needs and perspective of the public.
The ethical practice of human-centered civil justice design offers a syn-
thesis that sustains and protects the fairness, legitimacy, and justice of
our civil justice system.

